Power system restoration after outages caused by natural disasters is difficult owing to the damage caused to transmission lines. To formulate an effective power system restoration scheme and avoid damage to power equipment, it is necessary to obtain the availability of transmission lines in real time. Due to the complexity and variability of natural disasters, the availability assessment of transmission lines that depends on statistical data cannot give effective availability, which will lead to the failure of recovery. Two correlation models between transmission line availability and information of relay action are established and then applied to different relays in this paper. Combined with the real time record from the sequence of event (SOE), the online availability assessment method for transmission lines is proposed, which can obtain the damage probability of transmission lines in real time. The proposed method is verified by testing on the IEEE 39-bus model, and the simulation results show that it can assess the availability of transmission lines in real time without needing to consider the type of disaster, thus, helping to avoid the use of damaged transmission lines in the recovery process.
INDEX TERMS Availability assessment, extreme weather disaster, power system restoration, sequence of event (SOE). NOMENCLATURE P U (c), P R (c) Undesirable tripping probability and refusing tripping probability of the current differential relay P U (d), P R (d) Undesirable tripping probability and refusing tripping probability of the distance relay P U (b), P R (b) Undesirable tripping probability and refusing tripping probability of bus backup protection L Length of the transmission line l proI Length within the reach of the Zone-I distance relay
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l proII Length within the reach of the Zone-II distance relay P F (c 1 ), P A (c 1 )
Damage probability and availability of transmission line when current differential relay trips P F (c 0 ), P A (c 0 ) Damage probability and availability of transmission line when current differential relay does not trip P F (I 1 ), P A (I 1 )
Damage probability and availability of transmission line when Zone-I distance relay trips P F (I 0 ), P A (I 0 )
Damage probability and availability of transmission line when Zone-I distance relay does not trip P F (II 1 ), P A (II 1 ) Damage probability and availability of transmission line when Zone-II distance relay trips P F (II 0 ), P A (II 0 ) Damage probability and availability of transmission line when Zone-II distance relay does not trip P F (d 1 ), P A (d 1 )
Damage probability and availability of transmission line when distance relay trips P F (d 0 ), P A (d 0 )
Damage probability and availability of transmission line when distance relay does not trip P F (b 1 ), P A (b 1 )
Damage probability and availability of transmission line when bus bar backup relay trips P F (b 0 ), P A (b 0 ) Damage probability and availability of transmission line when bus bar backup relay does not trip P F1 , P F2 Damage probabilities of the transmission line based on the two sets of relays P Power system blackouts caused by natural disasters such as earthquakes, flooding, and snowstorms have posed one of the most significant threats to the secure and reliable power grid operation [1] , resulted in huge economic losses in the last decades. Therefore, rapid restoration of the grid after natural disasters is necessary. The conventional restoration strategy is based on the assumption that the transmission lines are fully available during the restoration process; however, blackouts caused by natural disasters may lead to damage of transmission network, which could result in failure of restoration [2] . Therefore, it is important to conduct an online availability assessment for transmission lines in power system restoration.
Researchers [3] , [4] have formulated advanced restoration plans for typical power system outages. Power system restoration comprises three temporal stages: preparation, system restoration, and load restoration [5] . In the second stage, the black-start generator (BSG) unit is restarted, the skeleton paths of transmission are energized, and the power generated from BSG is delivered to crank the nonblack-start generator (NBSG). It is at this stage that the availability of transmission lines needs to be considered.
Among the existing recovery algorithms, the methods for evaluating the availability of transmission lines are mainly divided into two categories. One is to build a statistic model on the basis of historical data. Ton et al. [6] considered the damage of transmission lines and applied it into the restoration process. Solheim and Kjølle [7] and Solheim and Trötscher [8] used reanalysis data and a Bayesian updating scheme to calculate failure probabilities for transmission lines. However, this kind of assessment method to obtain damage probability of transmission lines is based on normal cases in operation; it cannot describe the real condition of the transmission lines in disasters. The other one is to build a physical model of the disaster. Krishnasamy [9] conducted the assessment of the transmission line loads on a probabilistic basis. Savadjiev and Farzaneh [10] established the model of icing to analyze the ice shedding on overhead power lines. Yang et al. [11] established the probability model of ice storm damages on transmission facilities. Liu and Singh [12] built a fuzzy inference system to assess how natural disasters affect the reliability parameters of system components. Billinton and Singh [13] presented a three-state weather model to incorporate failures occurring in major adverse weather conditions. Guikema et al. [14] used a linear regression model to assess the damage of storms to the power system. However, it is very difficult to model natural disasters; furthermore, this kind of model focuses on a specific scenario, which is always different from the real condition, thus rendering it unsuitable for application. Neither of these two categories of methods can solve the problem of transmission lines availability assessment after natural disasters, because the off-line damage probability may give incorrect instructions for restoration plans. Thus, it is of great significance to assess the availability of transmission lines in real time.
Availability assessment is different from traditional fault diagnosis. The purpose of fault diagnosis is to help operators find out faults. But for availability assessment, finding out faults is not enough, it is also necessary to give the correctness probability of fault diagnosis results. The purpose is to determine whether the transmission line is available or not when selecting restoration paths.
In fact, the information from relays is directly related to the damage of transmission lines. In smart grids, the sequence of event (SOE) records obtained from the relay protection management information system (RPMIS) can be employed to continuously record the pickup of relays on transmission lines. Therefore, in this paper, the real time transmission lines availability assessment is accomplished based on the information from relays. At first, the probabilistic correlation model and sectional correlation model for the pickup of relays and damage of transmission lines are established. These models are then applied to three relays, namely differential current relay, distance relay, and bus bar backup relay, all of which are interdependent. Combined with the relay pickup information recorded by SOE in real time during natural disasters, the damage probability and availability of transmission lines can be obtained in real time.
Operators usually restore power supply according to the restoration plan prepared in advance. The real time availability assessment method of transmission lines proposed in this paper can help operators redefine the restoration plan according to the actual situation of the transmission lines, so as to improve the success rate of power supply restoration.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the availability assessment methods for the trans-mission lines based on two correlation models and different relays. In Section III, the final availability of each transmission line is derived by combining the availability obtained from different relays. Section IV briefly introduces the optimization strategy considering the availability of transmission lines. The detailed analysis of the algorithms including the optimization of generation start-up sequence and the network reconfiguration is given in the Appendix. Section V verifies the effectiveness of this methodology. Finally, the conclusions are given in Section VI.
II. AVAILABILITY ASSESSMENT OF TRANSMISSION LINES ON THE BASIS OF INFORMATION FROM PROTECTIONS
Differential current relays, distance relays, bus bar backup relays are configured to protect the transmission lines. Two correlation models of information from relays and transmission line availability are constructed and then applied to three relays in this section.
A. AVAILABILITY ASSESSMENT OF TRANSMISSION LINES BASED ON DIFFERENTIAL CURRENT RELAY AND BUS BAR BACKUP RELAY
Relays are not always reliable. Complex wiring and unstable components of power grid and other factors may cause undesirable tripping and refusing tripping of protective devices. The transmission line is still available when there is an undesirable tripping and is damaged if there is a refusing tripping. The reliability of relays conforms to a certain probability distribution, as the probabilistic correlation model shown in Fig.1 .
Based on the information recorded by SOE, the availability and damage probability of transmission lines can be 
where ''n'' denotes the type of relays, and the subscripts ''1/0'' denote ''tripping/no tripping of relays'', respectively.
B. AVAILABILITY ASSESSMENT OF TRANSMISSION LINES BASED ON DISTANCE RELAY
Distance relays always function as backup in conjunction with differential current relays. It is based on the current and voltage measured on the single terminal; thus, it cannot protect full length of the line. Therefore, stepping distance relays with different thresholds are usually installed on the same terminal. Zone-I protection usually needs to be implemented to meet the requirements of rapidity and it is customary to set the reach to approximately 85% of the transmission line length [15] . Zone-II protection meets the requirements of selectivity with delay; therefore, its protection zone usually can reach the neighbor lines, as shown in Fig.2 .
For zones I and II, the relationships between the operation of relays and transmission line availability are different, as the sectional correlation model of distance relay shown in Fig.3 .
Similarly, the probabilistic correlation model must be considered. Therefore, the availability and damage probability of transmission lines can be calculated for Zone-I and Zone-II as
Value of P A (I 0 ), P F (II 1 ), P A (I 1 ), P F (I 1 ), P A (II 0 ), P F (II 0 ) can then be calculated as (1) ∼ (3).
However, Zone-I and Zone-II are not independent of each other, and there are three possible situations based on the relationship:
The operational relationship between Zone-I and Zone-II relays can contribute more information to the assessment. The conditional probability for each situation is as
Combining the conditional probability and (1) ∼ (3), the damage probability when the distance relays trip can be obtained as
Based on the fact that the protection zone of Zone-I is included in that of Zone-II, which leads to P A (I 0 ) ⊂ P A (II 0 ), the availability probability when distance relays do not trip is:
P A (d 1 ), P F (d 0 ) can be calculated using (3).
III. PROPOSED AVAILABILITY ASSESSMENT BASED ON MULTI-INFORMATION FROM DIFFERENT RELAYS
Availability assessment models based on different isolated protections have been established, namely differential current protection, distance protection, and bus bar backup protection. These probabilities obtained from each protection separately are combined to derive the final damage.
In general, the primary and backup protections work together to detect and isolate faults on transmission lines. The primary protection has priority over the backup protection to operate instantaneously while the backup protection operates with a coordination delay in case the primary protection does not operate.
For transmission lines, differential current protection is the primary protection. Distance protection often functions as the backup. Bus bar backup protection has the least priority and is active when the circuit breaker fails to trip [15] . Simultaneously, in order to improve the reliability of protection, two sets of relays configured on the transmission line: one is on the terminal and the other on the opposite side of the terminal, as shown in Fig.4 .
Both sets are independent of each other, and for each set, there are four possible conditions for relay operation, as
The coordination relationship among the relays can be illustrated using the equations below.
where X, Y, and Z denote different relays. Equation (12) indicates that if none of the three relays trips, these protection units can be considered as independent of each other according to De Morgan's laws. Table 1 lists the damage probability and availability of the transmission line under different conditions.
Given that the two sets of protection units are independent of each other, the maximum of the two damage probabilities should be chosen as the final damage probability as shown in (13), considering the worst case that all three relays trip incorrectly.
Apart from protection relays, a circuit breaker is installed on each line. After the relay recognizes the fault, it picks up and trips, and then gives the circuit breaker a command to trip, so as to cut off the line. Whether the circuit breaker trips has no direct connection with whether or not the fault occurs. Therefore, only the information of relays is used in the models to assess the availability.
In addition, SOE records are generated from relays, and it is the incorrect relay action rather than the damage of the relay itself, that results in incorrect SOE record. In fact, in the power system, most of the protection and control devices are installed indoors, which are less affected by natural disasters such as typhoons, floods. The probability that these devices will be damaged in natural disasters is very small. Therefore, the damage probability of devices is not considered in the process of assessing the transmission line availability.
However, communication between these devices and utilities may indeed be affected by natural disasters. How to consider the influence of communication system when this method in practical application will be comprehensively discussed in the following work, and practical schemes available for engineering will be put forward.
Therefore, when SOE relay records are obtained from the RPMIS, the final damage probability can be calculated according to the proposed availability assessment method. Fig.5 shows the whole process of calculating transmission line damage probability after the outage caused by Fig.6 shows the flowchart of the recovery optimization algorithm under adverse weather disasters considering the damage probabilities of transmission lines based on the SOE records. The recovery strategy can be divided into two steps: the proposed availability assessment algorithm for transmission lines and the generator start-up optimization considering the path cranking time and network reconfiguration. The damage probability and availability of the transmission line obtained in the first step can be utilized as weights in the network reconfiguration in the second step during power system restoration.
IV. IMPROVED POWER SYSTEM RESTORATION OPTIMIZATION STRATEGY CONSIDERING THE AVAILABILITY OF TRANSMISSION LINES
The emphasis of this paper is not on the restoration algorithm. Therefore, the detailed algorithm analysis of the subsequent work, including the existing generator start-up optimization strategy [16] , reconfiguration using the Dijkstra algorithm [17] and constraints needed to be considered in the process is attached in the Appendix.
A. CALCULATION OF DAMAGE PROBABILITY AND AVAILABILITY
Under adverse weather conditions, the SOE records derived from the RPMIS in the smart grid can be used to obtain the realistic damage probability and availability of each transmission line through our proposed algorithm.
B. GENERATOR START-UP OPTIMIZATION WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE AVAILABILITY OF THE TRANSMISSION LINE
If the availability of the transmission line is not considered, as shown in stage II in the flowchart, the weight of the branches in network reconfiguration will depend only on the capacitance of the transmission line. The capacitance of the transformers can be considered as to be small (0.0001) if the admittance is unknown. Therefore, the integrated weight could be given as
Step 1 Optimize the generator start-up time: The initial generator start-up sequence is obtained by implementing the optimization module.
Step 2 Optimize the cranking path to start NBSGs: The given network reconfiguration needs to be implemented to obtain the optimal cranking path.
Step 3 Compare the start time and the path time: A time constraint should be added if there is no available cranking power for any NBSG unit at the generator start time. The load will pick up to maintain system frequency and balance reactive power. Then, the program will return to step 1 until all the generators are operational.
C. GENERATOR START-UP OPTIMIZATION CONSIDERING THE AVAILABILITY OF THE TRANSMISSION LINE
If the availability of transmission lines is considered in the existing optimization strategy, they need to be calculated first and integrated with the capacitance of the transmission line. Therefore, the weight of the branch in path cranking optimization is calculated using (20) in the Appendix.
Therefore, the proposed method for evaluating the availability of transmission lines based on relay protection information can be combined with the generator recovery sequence optimization model considering the path recovery time. In this manner, when choosing the recovery path, transmission lines with a high risk of overvoltage and large probability of damage can be avoided smoothly, and those with low risk of overvoltage and small probability of damage can be selected, thereby avoiding the risk of facing fault impact again and greatly reducing the time needed for recovery.
V. CASE STUDY
The IEEE 39-bus system is used to verify the proposed method. Fig.7 shows the topology of the system, which is known as the 10-machine New England Power System; it includes 10 generators, 39 buses, and 46 branches. When judging whether the transmission line is available or not, only the information of relay action on this line and its neighbor lines needs to be taken into account. That is, only the action information of relays on this line and those on the upstream and downstream lines are used. Action information of other relays in the system will not be used in the process. Therefore, testing the method on a larger system is as effective as on this IEEE 39-bus system, the IEEE 39-bus system is sufficient to validate the proposed method. Data about the system can be obtained from the IEEE benchmarks. The characteristics of the IEEE 39-bus generator units and the time to complete restorative actions are obtained from a study be Sun et al. [16] . CPLEX is adopted to solve the generator start-up optimization problem and MATLAB is used for solving the optimal cranking path in network reconfiguration.
The whole system is shown in black. When a disaster occurs, the main area in which damage is observed is shown with a red frame in Fig.7 . Unit G10 is a BSG, and G1-G9 are NBSG units. The restoration actions are checked and updated every ten minutes. Table 2 provides the statistical data of the three relays in the last three years in China [18] [19] [20] . Because natural disasters mainly affect outdoor transmission lines, and protection equipment such as relay protection are deployed indoors, the impact of natural disasters on the equipment itself is ignored. Therefore, the undesirable tripping probability and refusing tripping probability of each relay protection can be calculated based on the data in Table 2 .
A. CALCULATION OF DAMAGE PROBABILITY BASED ON SOE RECORDS
Because the relays whose protection zones are not included in the red-frame area have not tripped during the disaster, only the records of relays whose protection zones are in the suffering area are listed in Table 3 (the first two columns). In Table 3 , the digital number ''0'' represents no tripping of the relay whereas the number ''1'' represents tripping of the relay.
SOE records are generated from relay protection devices. The protection failures above refer to the incorrect operation of the protection devices, which results in incorrect SOE records, rather than the failure of the protection devices themselves to generate SOE records.
From the SOE relay records in Table 3 , the damage probability for each transmission line in the disaster area can be obtained after implementing the proposed assessment method. The results of the ultimate damage probability of each line are listed in Table 3 (the last column). It can be observed that the transmission lines 3-18, 16-17, 16-24, 17-18, 17-27, 23-24, 26-27 , and 26-29 are almost unavailable during restoration.
B. GENERATOR START-UP OPTIMIZATION WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE AVAILABILITY OF THE TRANSMISSION LINE
The optimization results of the generator start-up without considering the damage probability of the transmission line are shown in Table 4 (the third and fourth columns). It can be concluded that the unavailable transmission paths 3-18, 17-18, and 16-17 are inside the cranking path of G4, G5, G6, and G7, which aggravates the risk of power system restoration failure. The restoration time for cranking the G4, G5, G6, and G7 will be greater than the desired time because the breakers will be tripped during restoration if cranking on the damaged transmission line. Table 4 (the last two columns) lists the results of generator start-up optimization considering the availability of the transmission line.
C. GENERATOR START-UP OPTIMIZATION CONSIDERING THE AVAILABILITY OF THE TRANSMISSION LINE
Comparing the results of two cases in Table 4 , it can be concluded that the restoration process will be implemented smoothly if the availability of the transmission line is considered, because it can avoid cranking on the transmission lines that are severely damaged by disasters.
Therefore, the results from considering the availability of the transmission line are much better than the alternative. The proposed method can achieve rapid recovery from the outages due to natural disasters.
The simulation results show that the SOE records during the disasters can be used to assess the availability of the transmission line in the restoration. Further, the proposed algorithm based on SOE records is reasonable and easy to implement to help the system recover from disruptions. By revising the weight of each component in the branch, different combinations can be adapted to satisfy the requirements of the trade-off between the risks of over-voltage and unavailability.
VI. CONCLUSION
Based on the estimated probabilistic correlation model and sectional correlation model, an availability assessment method for the transmission lines is proposed in this paper using the SOE records during a disaster event.
The proposed method evaluates the availability of a transmission line in the real time based on the actual information from SOE records and the relationship between different relays; it is not influenced by the application scenario itself.
The simulation results prove that the proposed algorithm is effective, and easy to implement. The proposed algorithm can help damaged power systems recover rapidly from blackouts caused by natural disasters and avoid cranking on the probable damaged lines. Moreover, the proposed methodology can be adapted to different weather disaster scenarios.
APPENDIX
This attached section will introduce the traditional methods of generator start-up sequence optimization and grid restoration path optimization in power system restoration strategy, and how to combine the availability of transmission lines with the algorithm so as to provide a basis for the power system restoration strategy considering the availability of transmissionlines.
A. GENERATOR START-UP SEQUENCE OPTIMIZATION
Generally, at the start of restoration, the black-start generator (BSG) unit, e.g., hydro or combustion turbine generators, has to be started using its own resources. The power generated from the BSG should be delivered to crank nonblack-start generators (NBSGs) such as a steam turbine generator.
The objective is to maximize the overall generation capability during the restoration period.
The constraints include the critical maximum and minimum intervals and the start-up power requirements: t jstrat ≤ T max,j t jstrat ≥ T min,j j = 1, 2, . . . , M The generator start-up formulation is a nonlinear combinational optimization problem, which can be transformed into the MILP [16] . Moreover, the time taken to complete the restoration path cranking is also considered; therefore, the additional restraint of the generator restoration path cranking time is given by (18) if there is insufficient cranking power at the planned starting time for the NBSG unit j. t jstart ≥ t jpath (18) B. NETWORK RECONFIGURATION
The transmission lines or transformers could be considered as a branch of the power system network. Accordingly, the network reconfiguration during recovery can be effectively modeled as a network path optimization problem in graph theory, in which the optimal path would be found from one node to another in the network. Overvoltage risks, usually related to the charging capacitors of the transmission lines, must be considered in the power system restoration. Moreover, the unavailability risks, which are represented by the damage probability, should be integrated into the network reconfiguration. The objective function in the Dijkstra algorithm in the network reconfiguration is expressed as follows:
The integrated weight is given as follows:
Equations (19) and (20) indicate that a branch with lower overvoltage risk and higher availability is more likely to be chosen owing to its smaller integrated weight.
Therefore, the power equipment availability assessment methodology can be combined with the generator recovery sequence optimization model. Furthermore, the overvoltage risk and damage risk can be judged by modifying the expression of edge weights in the algorithm.
